The Executive Turnover Risk Premium
The Journal of Finance, vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 1529-1563, 2014.
(with Alexander Wagner)
Presented at the AFA Meetings 2010.
Abstract: We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely to be dismissed. At the same time, industry risk is, accounting for various other factors, unlikely to be associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using this identification strategy, we document that CEO turnover risk is significantly positively associated with compensation. This finding is important because job-risk compensating wage differentials arise naturally in competitive labor markets. By contrast, the evidence rejects an entrenchment model according to which powerful CEOs have lower job risk and at the same time secure higher compensation.
The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 31, no. 8, pp. 3212-3264, 2018.
(with Ulrike Malmendier and Enrico Moretti)
Presented at AFA Meetings 2009, EFA Meeting 2011, FIRS Meeting 2014, , Herzliya Summer Finance Conference 2014, Chicago Booth, DePaul, LSE, MIT Sloan, NBER Summer Institute 2013, NYU, Ohio State, Princeton, Tinbergen Institute, Yale.
Media mentions: CNN Money (May 2, 2012), Wall Street Daily (May 2, 2012)
Abstract: We propose a novel approach to measuring long-run returns to mergers. In a new data set of close bidding contests we use losers‘ post-merger performance to construct the counterfactual performance of winners had they not won the contest. Stock returns of winners and losers closely track each other over the 36 months before the merger, and bidders are also very similar in terms of Tobin’s Q, profitability and other accounting measures. Over the three years after the merger, however, losers outperform winners by 24 percent (14 percent internationally). Commonly used methodologies such as announcement returns fail to identify acquirors‘ underperformance.
(with Simas Kucinskas)
Presented at Bank of Lithuania, Dutch National Bank, HEC Paris, University of Amsterdam, University of Bonn, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
blog for a non-technical summary: link.
(with Torsten Jochem)
Miami Behavioral Finance Conference 2017, AFA 2018, EFA 2016, Research in Behavioral Finance Conference 2016, Columbia University, Dutch National Bank, Norwegian School of Economics, U Amsterdam, U Bonn, U Michigan.
(with Sudarshan Jayaraman, Todd Milbourne, and Hojun Seo)
Revise and resubmit at The Accounting Review
Presented at 2015 Conference on Convergence of Financial and Managerial Accounting Research, AFA 2016, 2016 MIT Asia Accounting Conference, 2016 FMA conference, Washington University in St. Louis.
Abstract: Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) theory predicts that firms filter out common shocks (i.e., those affecting the firm and its peers) while evaluating CEO performance and that the extent of filtering increases with the number of firms in the peer group. Despite the intuitive appeal of the theory, previous tests of RPE find weak and inconsistent evidence. We hypothesize that one reason for the mixed evidence is the inaccurate classification of peers. Rather than using static, pre-defined Standard Industry Classifications (SIC), we exploit recent advances in textual analysis and define peers based on firms’ product descriptions in their 10-K filings (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016). This alternative classification not only captures common shocks to firms’ product markets more effectively but also tracks the evolving nature of these markets, as 10-Ks are updated annually. Using product market peers, we find three pieces of evidence consistent with RPE in relation to CEO pay – (i) firms on average filter out common shocks to stock returns, (ii) the extent of filtering increases with the number of peers, and (iii) firms completely filter out common shocks in the presence of a large number of peers. We also examine forced CEO turnover decisions and find evidence consistent with RPE theory. Overall, our results suggest that a key identification strategy to testing RPE theory lies in accurately defining the peer group.
Risk Premia in Executive Compensation: A Life-Cycle Perspective, 2010
Presented at the Mitsui Finance Symposium, 2010, UC Berkeley Macro Lunch, UC Berkeley
Corporate Finance Lunch
WORK IN PROGRESS
- Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Turnover (with Martin Schmalz)
- Bias Contagion Among Sell-Side Analysts